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Abstract On the basis of findings from developmental biology, some researchers
have argued that evolutionary theory needs to be significantly updated. Advo-
cates of such a “developmental update” have, among other things, suggested
that we need to re-conceptualize units of selection, that we should expand our
view of inheritance to include environmental as well as genetic and epigenetic
factors, that we should think of organisms and their environment as involved
in reciprocal causation, and that we should reevaluate the rates of evolution-
ary change. However, many of these same conclusions could be reached on the
basis of other evidence, namely from microbiology. In this paper, I ask why
microbiological evidence has not had a similarly large influence on calls to
update biological theory, and argue that there is no principled reason to focus
on developmental as opposed to microbiological evidence in support of these
revisions to evolutionary theory. I suggest that the focus on developmental bi-
ology is more likely attributable to historical accident. I will also discuss some
possible room for overlap between developmental and microbiology, despite
the historical separation of these two subdisciplines.
Keywords microbiology · developmental biology · units of selection ·
inheritance · reciprocal causation · evolutionary rates
1 Introduction
Developmental biological evidence has provided the impetus for some scholars
to argue that biological theory, and evolutionary theory in particular, is in need
of revision. Developmental biologists have, among other things, shown that the





a one-to-one correspondence, and have demonstrated the importance of epi-
genetic factors, including in patterns of inheritance. By contrast, the received
view of evolutionary biology prioritizes genes as the vehicles for inheritance and
as the causes of phenotypes. Developmental systems theorists, for example, as
well as advocates for an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis, have argued that
this received view should be updated to account for developmental biological
evidence.
However, what has gone largely unnoticed by proponents of such a theoret-
ical update is that evidence from microbiology, not just developmental biology,
supports many of the same revisions. In this paper, I focus on four of them,
relating to: (1) units of selection, (2) modes of inheritance, (3) reciprocal cau-
sation, and (4) rates of evolution. On each of these four topics, I will argue,
developmental biology and microbiology are in agreement about the changes
to canonical evolutionary theory that are called for.
Ultimately, this paper seeks to answer the question: why hasn’t microbiol-
ogy had a greater impact on evolutionary theory? Of course, microbiology has
had a very large impact, especially resulting from advances in molecular biol-
ogy. But, I suggest, it could have been larger; microbiological evidence could
have been (and still could be) used to argue for some revisions to evolutionary
theory, in line with the revisions for which those focusing on developmental
biology have advocated. My thesis is that there is no in-principle reason why
a call for these revisions has been based on developmental biological evidence,
rather than microbiological evidence. To be clear, I will not be claiming that
developmental update proponents have insufficient evidence for their claims,
but that a focus on development per se is not necessary to motivate these the-
oretical claims. Accordingly, the challenge that proponents of these revisions
make to the received view of evolutionary biology is likely more systematic
and wide-ranging than a focus on developmental biology alone would suggest.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, in section 2, I will give
an overview of microbiological research relevant to evolutionary theorizing,
focusing on a subset of theoretical issues relevant to the topic of this paper. I
will discuss ways in which microbiology has, historically, impacted biological
theory, after which I will explain how current microbiological evidence provides
support for a reevaluation of units of selection, modes of inheritance, reciprocal
causation, and rates of evolution. Next, in sections 3 and 4, I will give a similar
overview for developmental biology: I will show how some proponents of a
“developmental update” have used evidence from developmental biology to
argue for broad revisions to evolutionary theory. Many of the recommendations
are the same as could be given based on microbiological evidence – especially
pertaining to the four issues on which I focus herein – but, as I will show,
proponents of a developmental update seldom utilize microbiological results.
Finally, in section 5, I will argue for the claim that there is no in-principle
reason why a call for theoretical revisions has focused on developmental rather
than microbiological evidence. I will suggest that it is more likely due to his-
torical accident, and propose a few possible historical contingencies that might
explain the disproportionate focus on developmental biology. I will close by
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offering some remarks on the possible overlap between developmental biology
and microbiology, which are intended to indicate that these subdisciplines need
not be as siloed as they lately have been.
2 Microbiology and Biological Theory
Microbiological research has historically been invaluable to evolutionary the-
orists. I will point out one particularly notable example, although there are
certainly others.
Research in microbiology in the twentieth century transformed the study of
phylogenetics. First of all, research on microorganisms revolutionized phyloge-
netic methods, specifically by contributing to an enormous amount of research
in molecular biology and gene sequencing, and recognizing the potential that
these techniques had for a more precise phylogenetics. Prior to these molecu-
lar methods, phylogenetic trees were largely based on morphological similarity,
presumed to indicate homology and therefore common ancestry (this method
is still frequently used in paleontology, especially when molecular evidence is
scant). However, morphological similarity is at best only a very rough indi-
cator of homology, so the resulting phylogenetic trees had a high associated
degree of uncertainty. Furthermore, other problems such as which characters
to focus on when measuring similarity/difference of two taxa caused the pro-
cess of making phylogenetic trees to be overly subjective or researcher-specific.
Methods which relied on molecular data, by contrast, used traits that were ex-
plicitly linked to inheritance (namely, genes) and which could be surveyed and
quantified more methodically than morphological traits. Nowadays, of course,
molecular methods are used for more than just microorganisms – these meth-
ods are used across all three domains to construct phylogenetic trees – but the
methods were developed by microbiologists, using microbial life (for a detailed
history, see Quammen 2018).
Second, using these molecular techniques, microbiologists provided evi-
dence that there are three biological domains: eukarya, consisting of all of
the meso-sized organisms with which we are accustomed (as well as many mi-
crobes), bacteria, and archaea. Woese and Fox (1977), Woese et al. (1978), and
Woese et al. (1990) in particular showed that then-standard depictions of the
tree of life consisting of five kingdoms or those which divided all life forms into
either eukaryotes or prokaryotes were both insufficient, and suggested adding a
higher taxonomic level of “domain.” Perhaps surprisingly, Woese et al. (1990)
argued on the basis of molecular evidence (specifically, rRNA sequencing) that
the split between bacteria and the other domains occurred before the split be-
tween eukarya and archaea, implying that prokaryotes did not form a mono-
phyletic group. Note that, more recently, Cox et al. (2008) have provided a
substantially different tree than Woese et al.’s, although both trees have the
aforementioned implications for the history of life and for taxonomy.
These contributions to biological practice and theory are based largely on
advances within molecular biology. Microorganisms are particularly easy to
4 Aja Watkins
utilize to study molecular biology, and therefore were crucial in making the
advances enumerated in the preceding paragraphs. However, microbiology is
not reducible to molecular biology. Indeed, microbiology involves the study of
more than two biological domains (all archaea and bacteria, as well as any
microscopic eukaryotes). It therefore wouldn’t be surprising if microbiology
had even wider-ranging implications for evolutionary theorizing. Yet, as I will
argue, many of the implications of microbiology haven’t been taken up by
evolutionary theorists – or, when those implications have been taken up, it
has been on the basis of developmental, rather than microbiological evidence.
I am not the first to claim that microbiology has been neglected in biological
theorizing (e.g., O’Malley and Parke 2020). Human scientists and philosophers
alike have a bias for studying medium-sized phenomena. I suspect that this
bias, among other factors, has led those interested in an update to evolutionary
theory to focus so much of their attention on research in developmental biology
in particular. Rather, as I will show, they could just as well have looked to
significant microbiological research in support of the same theoretical claims.
The following subsections each deal with one topic for which the impli-
cations of developmental biological and microbiological research are similar.
These topics are: units of selection (section 2.1), modes of inheritance (section
2.2), reciprocal causation (section 2.3), and rates of evolutionary change (sec-
tion 2.4). I will first address the microbiological support regarding these topics,
returning to a discussion of the relevant developmental biological evidence in
section 4.
2.1 Units of Selection
The debate in evolutionary biology regarding units of selection is usually about
how different levels of selection interact or conflict: genes, cells, organisms, pop-
ulations, species (Okasha, 2006; Lloyd, 2020). A close examination of microbi-
ological research has led at least some theoretical biologists and philosophers
of biology to reconsider this debate, a suggestion which has not been taken up
in mainstream biology. Several insights from microbiology are important here.
First, microorganisms often serve as symbionts in relation to larger or-
ganisms. According to O’Malley (2014), this is also the most obvious way to
relate microbiology to developmental biology: microbial symbionts affect the
development of their hosts. She supports this with several examples: “Gut
microbes influence the development of the animal gut; arthropod and nema-
tode reproductive systems develop in dependence on bacterial Wolbachia and
endosymbionts; the light organ of the squid, Euprymna scolopes, develops dra-
matically in response to colonization by Vibrio bacteria; rhizobia affect the
development of plant root nodules” (p. 118). Noticing the tight relationship
between microbial symbionts and their macrobial hosts may get us to rethink
what the appropriate units of selection are. Especially in cases of obligate
symbiosis, where neither the microorganisms nor the hosts can survive (or,
perhaps, reproduce) without the aid of the other, it seems misguided to think
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of natural selection acting on individual organisms as units of selection; rather,
collectives consisting of symbionts can be said to co-evolve.
However, note that O’Malley (2014) does not think that bacterial processes
are merely environmental factors in the development of multicellular organisms
– the microorganisms themselves develop according to these interactions (p.
119). As we will see in section 4, many developmental biologists are happy to
analyze microorganisms as developmental resources, but rarely consider them
as developing entities in their own right. I will attempt to point out this pattern
throughout the paper, and return to a discussion of it at the end.
In the context of units of selection, microbiologists might point out that the
problem with symbiosis runs even deeper, due to the importance of endosymbiosis
or symbiogenesis. Endosymbiosis is literally when one symbiont lives inside of
another (its host), but the term is usually used to refer to a specific set of
crucial evolutionary moments, first argued for by Margulis (1967), where mi-
croorganisms combined as symbionts to form entirely new types of cells: mito-
chondria became a stable element of many eukaryotic cells (including our own),
and chloroplasts became an essential organelle in photosynthesizing organisms
(e.g., plants). These organelles were originally free-living microbes, and now
occupy an essential place in the cells of many organisms. Thus, to say that
a single organism (for instance, one human) should count as the appropriate
unit of selection is already to admit the importance of symbionts for defining
the units of selection, since each cell of that organism contains endosymbionts.
Therefore, even if we ignore cases of symbiosis between microbes and mac-
robes, the symbiosis within the cells of many organisms cannot be ignored,
and has implications for what we take to be the units of selection.
Other than as pertains to symbiosis, there are other microbial examples
that make deciding on an appropriate unit of selection rather difficult. Some
well-known examples are slime molds and biofilms. Both are cases where a com-
munity of microorganisms seems to act as one “unit,” although that unit has
blurry boundaries and can grow or shrink by adding or subtracting members
(including by reproduction of its member microorganisms). Basically, these
cases show that sometimes aggregates of organisms, rather than individual
organisms, are perhaps better suited to be considered units of selection.
One proposal for units of selection that has received relatively little philo-
sophical or biological attention is that of holobionts (e.g., Guerrero et al. 2013;
Richardson 2017, although cf. Skillings 2016). A holobiont is a unit that com-
prises a host and all of its symbionts, or, as in the case of slime molds and
biofilms, an aggregate (see Doolittle and Booth 2017 for a discussion of holo-
bionts that includes biofilms). There is far from any consensus about whether
or when holobionts are useful as units of selection, and whether the holo-
biont concept is useful in this context likely depends on whether particular
host-symbiont associations have a deep, evolutionary history or not. However,
suffice it to say that holobionts have been proposed as alternative units of
selection on the basis of microbiological evidence.
Therefore, there is ample microbiological evidence to recommend an update
in the biological treatment of units of selection.
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2.2 Modes of Inheritance
Microbiology has also complicated the common notion of inheritance: that
inheritance occurs between parent and offspring only, largely in the form of
genetic material.
First, even within a gene-centric view of inheritance, microbial systems
suggest that inheritance should not be thought of as an exclusively vertical
process. Lateral gene transfer (LGT), which encompasses a variety of processes
by which microorganisms exchange genetic material with one another (and
sometimes with macroorganisms!), is likely a common phenomenon and one
which is known to alter the evolutionary trajectory of microbial lineages. LGT
implies, for example, that phylogenetic trees need not be strictly-branching,
and could instead have a reticulate structure. (For a discussion of the theoret-
ical implications of LGT, see O’Malley 2014, p. 80-85, 101-108.)
Second, symbiosis, including endosymbiosis, also recommends an updated
account of modes of inheritance, because symbionts can be inherited. For in-
stance, proponents of the holobiont view mentioned in the previous section
often point to the fact that our microbiomes are inherited both vertically and
horizontally to show that inheritance is rather more complicated than the
standard picture allows. Inheritance of symbionts challenges not only the rel-
ative prevalence of vertical compared to horizontal inheritance, but is also an
example of non-genetic material being inherited.
Third, some have taken evidence of directed mutagenesis in microorganisms
as evidence for the inheritance of acquired characteristics. O’Malley (2014),
for example, in chronicling the persistence of Lamarckism in interpretations
of microbiology, notes that “discovering spontaneous mutations [in E. coli ] far
from demolished Lamarckian frameworks for microbial evolution” (p. 98). In
large part, this is because of evidence for directed mutagenesis (also called
“hypermutation” or “adaptive mutation”), wherein mutations occur not ran-
domly but in response to environmental conditions.1 Most random mutations,
at least in coding or regulatory regions, are bound to be deleterious, but di-
rected mutations will not be. The inheritance of a directed mutation resembles
a Lamarckian process of inheritance insofar as what is being inherited is ac-
quired in response to environmental conditions.
Fourth, microorganisms themselves can serve as evidence that epigenetic
inheritance systems are at play. Jablonka and Lamb (1995, 2005), who nor-
mally tend to focus on the developmental biology literature, in fact use many
examples of epigenetics in microorganisms. For example, although Jablonka
and Lamb (2005) focus much of their discussion of epigenetic inheritance on
plants and animals, they also bring up cellular memory in bacteria (p. 119)
and the inheritance of cellular structures in ciliates such as Paramecium (p.
121-122). In a sense, any discussion of epigenetics which involves a thorough
description of various epigenetic processes will be bound to discuss microbial
1 See also experiments utilizing mutator strains, e.g. Sniegowski et al. (1997); thanks to
Maureen O’Malley for this suggestion.
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cases, as microorganisms often serve as model organisms in experiments on
intracellular processes (for more on microbes as models systems, see O’Malley
et al. 2015; O’Malley and Parke 2018).
All of this is to say that one need not look at the processes involved in the
development of multicellular organisms to see that an expanded view of inheri-
tance is warranted. Evidence from microbiology indicates both that horizontal,
as opposed to merely vertical, inheritance, as well as non-genetic inheritance,
is common and of evolutionary importance.
2.3 Reciprocal Causation
Prior to any suggestion of a developmental update, the standard view about
the causal relationship between environments and the organisms that inhabit
them is that the environment exerts selective pressure on organisms and, per-
haps, provides resources for the organisms. This causal account is unidirec-
tional: the environment can, potentially, have a causal force on the organ-
ism. By contrast, bidirectional causation between organism and environment
is called “reciprocal causation.” Evidence from microbiology recommends a re-
ciprocal causation relationship, by pointing out ways in which organisms can,
to some extent, control their environment.
Microbiologists are well aware of the effect that microorganisms can have
on their environments; indeed, the largest-scale environmental change of biotic
origin that we know of, the so-called Great Oxidation Event of 2.4 billion
years ago, was the result of cyanobacteria (e.g., Canfield 2005; Sessions et al.
2009; Gumsley et al. 2017; see O’Malley 2014, chpt. 1 for a discussion of
the importance of this event for evolutionary transitions). Indeed, many of
the Earth’s biogeochemical cycles, including the carbon and nitrogen cycles,
among others, are mediated by the metabolic behavior of microbes (e.g., Bitton
2005; Merchant and Helmann 2012; Rousk and Bengtson 2014). For example,
Pajares and Ramos (2019) present the case that the prevalence of nitrogen-
fixing microorganisms in the ocean (which make ambient nitrogen available for
biological use, in the form of ammonia) also control the carbon cycle, because
nitrogen fixation affects rates of primary production in the ocean, and rates of
primary production affect rates of carbon draw-down from the atmosphere into
the surface waters, and ultimately carbon export to the sea floor. These various
cycles are complex and interconnected, then, but for our purposes the point is
that the behavior of microorganisms is affecting the environmental resources
available to those same (or other) organisms. I suggest that this behavior of
microorganisms be seen as an instance of niche construction, where organisms
are influencing the conditions of their environment.
A further way in which microbes can participate in niche construction also
occurs in the context of symbiosis or parasitism (although, as has been the case
in other sections, it is not necessary to think of microbes merely as symbionts
to reach the conclusion that they construct their environment, as is clear from
the previous paragraph). In particular, microorganisms which inhabit a host
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often influence the host’s behavior in ways that potentially benefit the mi-
croorganism residents. Wolbachia, a genus of parasitic microorganism which
has infected a remarkably high proportion of insects (Taylor et al., 2018), is
a prime example; as reviewed by Bi and Wang (2020), Wolbachia infections
are known to cause change in reproductive strategy (e.g., Hurst et al. 1999;
Knight 2001), but also possibly behaviors related to sleep, learning and mem-
ory, feeding, and aggression.
Thus, evidence from microbiology points to recognizing that organisms can
exert a causal influence on their environments, as well as vice versa.
2.4 Rates of Evolution
Finally, evidence from microbiology has implications for the expected rates of
evolution. The standard view on evolutionary rates is that they are controlled
by the rate of mutation, which is (roughly) constant.
Primarily, the connection between microbiology and rates of evolution has
to do with horizontal inheritance (see section 2.2). Contrary to the standard
view, if inheritance can happen via horizontal modes, such as lateral gene
transfer, then the rates of change of genes or of other horizontally-inherited
traits will be faster than commonly recognized.
In her theory of endosymbiosis between the mitochondria and its host, Mar-
gulis recognized the possible implication for rates of evolution. Endosymbiosis
is mostly accepted today to explain at least one of the major evolutionary
transitions (cf. O’Malley and Powell 2016). Much less accepted to this day is
Margulis and Sagan (2004)’s more recent argument that horizontal inheritance
is largely responsible for speciation events in general. O’Malley (2014, p. 83-
84) also discusses the implications of lateral gene transfer for speciation. While
it may seem far-fetched to argue that endosymbiosis or lateral gene transfer is
the primary cause of speciation, these sudden evolutionary changes – sudden
if compared to natural selection on random mutation – do call into question
long-held assumptions about gradual change by random mutation, and should
be investigated empirically.
Thus, an examination of microbiological evidence has led some to say that
the prevalence of horizontal inheritance should increase the estimated rates of
evolutionary change.
In this section, we have seen that, while microbiological research has had a
great influence on biological theorizing over the last several decades, it has
broader implications than have been taken up in mainstream biology. How-
ever, some biologists and others have drawn similar conclusions from results
in developmental biology, arguing that these should enter into the mainstream
– but they are not using microbiological evidence to make their case. In the
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next section, I will discuss their arguments, and the evidence they do use: from
developmental biology.
3 The Developmental Update
In this section, I will elaborate on the various views associated with what I am
calling the “developmental update:” the update for evolutionary theory called
for on the basis of developmental biological evidence. I will focus especially
on developmental systems theory; this view has received the most philosoph-
ical attention, and, as a rather extreme version of the views in favor of a
developmental update, is useful for illustrative purposes. I will also discuss the
Extended Evolutionary Synthesis as well as some neighboring views of several
other influential developmental biologists. The purpose of this section will be
to demonstrate what proponents of the developmental update are advocating
for, exactly.
Unlike the claims reviewed in section 2, which are rather disjoint, the de-
velopmental update has become a reasonably unified view of how biological
theory should be updated (although, as we will see, there are some important
disagreements). Therefore, unlike in my discussion of microbiology, I think it
is useful to spend some time discussing the relationship between the various
tenets of the developmental update, as well as the evidential basis for their
claims, so that the reader can understand how the various pieces fit together.
After providing a more general overview of the developmental update, I will
focus individually on the same four issues as in section 2 – units of selection,
modes of inheritance, reciprocal causation, and rates of evolution – in section
4.
In what follows, I will be using a relatively broad concept of development,
so I want to clarify it from the outset to prevent misunderstanding. Devel-
opment is the process by which an organism has come to be what it is. This
can involve physical growth from embryo to adult form, as is typically studied
by many developmental biologists, but also learning (related to knowledge or
behavior), senescence, and more.2 Part of what many proponents of a devel-
opmental update are pointing out is how ubiquitous developmental processes
are, so, in order to speak their language I will utilize this broad view. Accord-
ingly, many of the biologists who advocate for a developmental update base
their work not just on developmental biology but on ethology, psychology, and
more; for brevity, I will not distinguish these subdisciplines here. The main
insight of developmental biology in the broad sense is that development is
exceedingly complex: a whole host of factors (what some refer to as “devel-
opmental resources”) affect development in interconnected ways, sometimes
ways which are difficult to anticipate.
2 Others have used a narrower conception of development, one which only focuses on how
the shape, size, structure, and anatomy of organisms, especially their morphological features,
come to be. This is plausibly the result of a focus on the ontogeny of form in developmental
biology. For narrower conceptions along these lines, see, e.g., Robert (2004); Love (2007,
2020).
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By contrast, the so-called “central dogma” of molecular biology, which says
that information may travel from nucleic acid (DNA or RNA) to protein but
not from protein to nucleic acid (Crick, 1958), is very linear. Views associated
with the developmental update can be viewed as a response to the central
dogma, insofar as they all reject this privileged position of genetic material as
the only source of information; other developmental resources, developmental
update proponents will say, are just as crucial. Various components of the
developmental update also respond to related assumptions of classical evolu-
tionary biology, such as the assumption that all inheritance is genetic, that
heritable genetic variation is the primary source of phenotypic variation, and
that macro-evolutionary patterns can be explained by appeal to changes in
gene frequencies. This section will explicate the views of various proponents
of the developmental update, including how these views hang together. As far
as I know, a detailed account of the similarities and differences between these
views does not exist elsewhere in the philosophical or biological literature.
I will start with developmental systems theory (DST), which has received
the most philosophical attention. The ideas of DST were preceded by, among
others, Kuo (1921, 1922, 1928, 1929, 1967), Carmichael (1925), Waddington
(1941, 1942), McGraw (1946), Schneirla (1956), Lehrman (1953, 1970), Got-
tlieb (1970, 1976a,b, 1981), Wohlwill (1973), Lewontin (1974, 1982), Bateson
(1978, 1983), Lerner (1978), and Levins and Lewontin (1985).3 Many of these
researchers focused on developmental psychology and behavior, rather than
embryology. Work on DST began in earnest with Oyama (1985). Oyama ar-
gues against the claim that genes encode information, which in turn gives in-
struction for the developmental process. She argues that genetic information
is itself a product of development, and that rather than studying organisms as
the product of genetic information acting based on environmental conditions
(the standard, “interactionist” view) we should study entire developmental
systems. Indeed, Oyama suggests that there is causal parity between genetic
and environmental causes; this claim came to be known as the “parity thesis”
of DST.
The next major innovation in DST came with Griffiths and Gray (1994),
in which the authors argue that the parity thesis has several important impli-
cations for evolutionary theory. These authors were especially arguing against
a “gene’s eye” view of evolution (e.g., Dawkins 1976), connecting the critiques
of the behavioral psychology tradition instantiated by Oyama to the rejection
of the central dogma and other gene-centered views in evolutionary biology.
First, Griffiths and Gray define the “developmental system” as all of “the re-
sources that produce the developmental outcomes that are stably replicated”
in a given lineage (p. 278). Second, they note that the replication of pheno-
types from one generation to the next requires the replication of this entire
developmental system, not just the genetic components of it (p. 283). One
consequence of this view is that many factors outside of the organism itself,
3 For a more comprehensive history of DST, including more details on these early thinkers,
see Johnston (2001, 2009), Gottlieb (2001), Lehrman (2001), and Griffiths and Tabery
(2013).
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such as many features of its environment (e.g., nests, burrows, beaver dams,
anthills), will be involved in and can be given an evolutionary explanation (p.
288). Third, Griffiths and Gray argue that DST recommends that life cycles
– or, “a series of cycles of a developmental process” – be the primary unit
of evolutionary analysis (p. 291); I will return to this view in more depth in
section 4. Finally, Griffiths and Gray criticize the view that genes or DNA
“self-replicate,” suggesting instead both that DNA cannot self -replicate (i.e.,
without environmental input) and that all developmental processes replicate
as part of the recurrence of a life cycle (p. 299-300).
The tenets of DST are usually represented as a list.4 I find it more illu-
minating to specify the logical and evidential relations between the tenets of
DST, which I will now attempt to summarize.
DST takes seriously empirical evidence that development is contextual (the
result of development depends on context), contingent (the results of devel-
opment vary), constructive (development is a process requiring many inputs),
and interactive (these inputs interact with one another to produce the de-
velopmental result).5 Constructivism and interactionism have led DST pro-
ponents to reject any metaphysical distinction between genetic and environ-
mental causes, and, in turn, to reject the nature-nurture dichotomy (Ford
and Lerner, 1992; Gray, 1992; Bateson, 2001; Oyama, 2002; Stotz, 2008). Im-
portantly, though, DST theorists distance themselves from the standard kind
of interactionism that maintains a genetic-environmental dichotomy, insofar
as such a dichotomy implies that we could separate out the contributions of
genetic from non-genetic causes (Oyama, 2002). Contextualism, contingency,
constructivism, and interactionism, in combination, provide support for DST’s
aforementioned parity thesis: that all causal factors related to development are
on a par (Ford and Lerner, 1992; Griffiths and Gray, 1994, 1997; Oyama, 2000,
2001; Shea, 2011; Griffiths, 2017).
The remainder of DST follows from the parity thesis. First and foremost,
the parity thesis indicates that we should expand our focus to the entire devel-
opmental system, rather than individual organisms (certainly not just genes!).
The developmental system includes the organism and all of the developmental
resources involved in that organism’s development, including all parts of its en-
vironment. Second, and consequently, DST theorists have, following Griffiths
and Gray (1994), thereby re-conceptualized evolution as change in develop-
mental systems, and, as a result of doing so, have argued for an expanded
view of inheritance (e.g., Jablonka and Lamb 2005). Any developmental re-
source, including genes but also environmental factors, can be inherited (and
can play the same role in evolution of any inherited factor, namely, to affect
differential survival and reproduction), so there is naturally a strong connec-
tion between the view that a broad range of developmental resources must be
considered and the view that inheritance is more extensive than just genetic
4 For instance, Gray (1992); Griffiths and Knight (1998); Godfrey-Smith (2000); Oyama
et al. (2001); Robert et al. (2001); Stotz (2008); Johnston (2009); Pradeu (2010); Griffiths
and Hochman (2015).
5 For some nuances regarding this empirical support, see Watkins (2021b).
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inheritance. Third, the parity thesis implies that genetic factors should not
be privileged in explanations of development; the controls of developmental
processes are distributed among many resources. This is what has resulted in
DST being described as “a kind of extreme anti-preformationism” (Godfrey-
Smith, 2000, 2001). A fourth consequence of the parity thesis and of focusing
on developmental systems as a whole is that the organism and the environ-
ment co-cause one another: both organism and environment are involved in
the same developmental system, each part of which can be causally efficacious.
Co-causation between organism and environment has, in turn, caused develop-
mental systems theorists to pay special attention to niche construction (how an
organism’s behavior shapes its own environment and thereby its own selective
pressures). Niche construction also relates directly to DST’s expanded view
of inheritance; organisms inherit the niche which was, in part, constructed by
past generations.
Proponents (and some opponents) of DST have also clarified the impli-
cations of DST for a number of related topics, including modularity (Moss,
2001; Griffiths and Gray, 2001), innateness (Griffiths, 2002), information the-
ory (Griffiths and Gray, 2004; Griffiths, 2017), the difference between inter-
and intraindividual comparisons (Molenaar et al., 2003), and process ontology
(Griffiths and Stotz, 2018). There has also been extensive discussion over the
methodological implications of DST, including whether there are any (Ford
and Lerner, 1992; Wimsatt, 2001; Godfrey-Smith, 2001; Molenaar et al., 2013;
Longino, 2013). Relatedly, there has been some debate about whether DST is
“experimentally unwieldy” (Robert et al., 2001) due to advancing an extreme
holism or whether it has empirical consequences (Sterelny and Kitcher, 1988;
Sterelny et al., 1996; Griffiths and Gray, 1997; Oyama, 2000; Griffiths and
Gray, 2005; Griffiths and Hochman, 2015).
Despite the efforts of DST proponents, mainstream biology still tends to
treat genes and environmental factors as acting in combination to produce
phenotypes. This standard “interactionist” view is antithetical to the claims
of DST proponents, as it continues to treat genes and environments as two
distinct causes. The more radical claim that all developmental resources should
be treated on a par has overwhelmingly not been adopted. That said, there
are some notable exceptions, many of which are, I believe, often overlooked by
explicit advocates of DST. In order to highlight the similarities between DST
and some other work in theoretical developmental biology, I will also elaborate
on several other views which seek to incorporate developmental biology more
thoroughly into theoretical and evolutionary biology. DST proponents and
those who propound these other views have in common that they are seeking
a “developmental update” to theoretical biology.
I will focus especially on the arguments given by West-Eberhard (2003),
who provides undoubtedly the most extensive treatment of the theoretical
implications of developmental biology, although I will cite others who have
made similar arguments when appropriate. Like the proponents of DST, West-
Eberhard notes that, historically, the role of genes in development and evo-
lution has been privileged over the role of any other factor, including envi-
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ronmental ones (p. 4). She attributes this to neglect of developmental biology
by evolutionary biology,6 which has focused more on advances within molec-
ular biology (p. 6, 17, 19, 193, 335; although see Gilbert 2017 regarding the
reemergence of developmental biology at the fore of biological research). West-
Eberhard, like other developmental update proponents, criticizes the use of
metaphors for the role of genes, such as the “program” metaphor and the
“blueprint” metaphor (p. 13-15; see also Nijhout 1990; Pigliucci 2001, p. 21,
50, 68, 115, 129). She emphasizes the ubiquity of developmental plasticity, or
the ability of an organism to change its phenotype in response to different
environmental conditions (p. 33); West-Eberhard calls this feature of develop-
ment “condition sensitivity” (e.g., p. 17; see also Pigliucci 1998, 2001; Gilbert
2005). This lines up with DST’s emphasis on the contingency and contextual
dependence of development.
West-Eberhard also argues at length for the interchangeability of genetic
and environmental factors in producing phenotypes; while she stops short of
claiming that there is no causal distinction between the two, she does think
that any given developmental process can be triggered by genetic or environ-
mental switches (p. 19, 99), and that genetic and environmental factors can
similarly become entrenched in the developmental process (p. 500-503). For
instance, she claims that both genes and the environment can serve exactly
two roles in development: as information, or as building blocks (p. 107-108).
West-Eberhard thus takes herself to be claiming that genetic and environ-
mental factors interact in development, not just in the trivial sense that no
phenotype is produced without some genetic and some environmental influ-
ence (a view that traditionally takes genes to be serving the informational
role, while the environment just provides building blocks), but in the stronger
sense that development is influenced by genes and the environment in identical
ways. West-Eberhard would, then, likely agree with DST proponents on the
interactive nature of development. She also indicates a similar rejection of (or
solution to) the nature-nurture debate (p. 3, 33, 329, 499; see also Pigliucci
2001, p. 124, 254).
West-Eberhard (2003)’s aim is to provide a revised understanding of evo-
lution in light of these developmental principles, and can thus be compared
with Griffiths and Gray (1994). West-Eberhard and Griffiths and Gray do not
agree on everything when it comes to the relationship between developmental
and evolutionary biology (and their disagreements will be discussed to some
extent in section 4), but several of their claims are compatible. West-Eberhard
emphasizes that selection acts on phenotypes, which are the result of develop-
mental processes influenced by both genetic and environmental factors (p. 16).
As West-Eberhard notes, then, “The environmental sensitivity of development
means that environmental variation can be a source of the selectable pheno-
typic variation that fuels adaptive evolution” (p. 29; see also Gilbert et al. 2015;
6 Including evolutionary developmental biology (“evo-devo”), which “extensively treats
the genomic correlates of gross morphological variation across phyla, with little or no dis-
cussion of behavior, physiology, life histories, and the kind of variation within populations
that is required for natural selection to work” (p. 89).
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Moczek et al. 2011). Environmentally induced phenotypes can serve the same
role evolutionarily as genetically induced phenotypes, including recurrence and
heritability (p. 144). Selected-for traits will have an increased frequency of ex-
pression, which, as a consequence of gene-environment interchangeability, can
be either genetically or environmentally caused (p. 149). West-Eberhard does
want to reserve the gene-environment distinction (e.g., she thinks that adap-
tive evolution always involves gene frequency changes), thereby disagreeing
with the metaphysical claims of DST proponents. However, she views evolu-
tionary change in much the same way as advocates of DST: a whole host of
developmental resources can be inherited, are required for development, and
will produce phenotypes upon which selection acts.
Another viewpoint which is unofficially allied with that of DST is a view
held by some of the proponents of the so-called Extended Evolutionary Syn-
thesis (EES). The Extended Evolutionary Synthesis, as the name suggests, is
supposed to extend the Modern Synthesis (MS) between Darwinian natural
selection and Mendelian genetics, in particular to include new theoretical re-
sults from developmental biology. A brief examination of some of the claims of
EES proponents will make apparent the similarities with DST and other devel-
opmental update proponents. Laland et al. (2015) give a brief overview of the
main differences between the MS and the EES. They list the following prin-
ciples of the EES: (1) reciprocal causation, (2) inclusive inheritance, (3) non-
random phenotypic variation, (4) variable rates of change, (5) an organism-
centered (rather than gene-centered) perspective, and (6) developmental bias
in macroevolution (p. 2). Several of these principles match up with the tenets
of DST, and thus also with claims made by West-Eberhard inter alia. For
instance, both DST and EES proponents are unsatisfied by an overempha-
sis on genetic, rather than epigenetic or environmental, causes of phenotypes.
Reciprocal causation between organisms and their environment, as well as an
extended view of inheritance, is emphasized explicitly by DST proponents.
Non-random variation and developmental bias in macroevolution are not a fo-
cus of DST, but both of these principles are consistent with many of the claims
of DST, especially insofar as both emphasize the importance of development
and developmental systems. Centering the organism in the EES is related to
the debate over units of selection; I will discuss this (as well as the issue of
rates) in section 4. For further discussion on the merits of an ESS, see Laland
et al. (2014) as well as Pigliucci and Schlichting (1997) and Pigliucci (2006,
2007).
Importantly, the developmental update position should be distinguished
from various other positions which are informed by developmental biology
but which, unlike the developmental update view, do not call for broad re-
vision of biological theorizing. For instance, many developmental biologists
have no problem with the central dogma of molecular biology; these biologists
should not be considered to be proponents of what I’ve been calling a devel-
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opmental update, regardless of their other views.7 Other scholars have also
discussed the difference between DST and evolutionary developmental biol-
ogy, also known as “evo devo” (Robert et al., 2001; Jablonka and Lamb, 2002;
Griffiths and Gray, 2004).8 For instance, Robert et al. (2001) notes that DST
proponents (among other developmental update proponents I have discussed
here) emphasize the inheritance of not just genes and epigenetic potential, but
also epigenetic processes and environmental factors, whereas evo-devo as a re-
search program tends to only emphasize genetic inheritance and inheritance of
epigenetic potential (p. 960). While it is outside of the scope of this paper to
further discuss other, developmentally-informed positions which do not call for
a developmental update, it is important to note that there are such positions.
The goal of this section was to provide an overview of the positions which
involve advocating for a developmental update to theoretical biology. However,
the main focus of this paper is on four specific themes of the developmental
update: units of selection, modes of inheritance, reciprocal causation, and rates
of evolution.
4 The Developmental Update and Microbiology
This section zooms in on these four themes and discusses the developmen-
tal update arguments concerning them, as well as how these arguments have
tended to neglect relevant microbiological evidence. I have chosen these four
themes because I think in each case a focus on microbiological research, and
not just developmental biological research, has the potential to motivate the
same sorts of updates to biological theory. I will thus be using these four
themes to argue that a focus on developmental biology as the evidence base
for these theoretical consequences is not better in principle than a focus on
microbiology, and thus that the focus on developmental biology is most likely
a historical accident. To be clear, I don’t intend to pit developmental biologists
against microbiologists in any way, nor to fault developmental biologists for
their lack of focus on microbiological results. However, I do think that it is an
interesting historical fact that developmental update proponents have solely
used developmental evidence and not microbiological evidence to make their
points.
4.1 Units of Selection
A focus on entire developmental systems, rather than just their component
parts, complicates the units of selection debate. For starters, developmental
update proponents are, predictably, going to reject any claim that genes are the
appropriate units of selection, as well as any replicator-vehicle distinction upon
7 Regarding the overlapping research programs of developmental and molecular biology,
see Love (2020).
8 For philosophical work on evo-devo, see, e.g., Love (2015, 2017).
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which that claim rests (Gray, 1992). So far, though, there is not agreement
among developmental update proponents about what the appropriate units of
selection should be, exactly, although there does seem to be agreement that
developmental biology bears on the units of selection debate.
One proposal offered by DST theorists is that the appropriate unit of se-
lection is the life cycle (Griffiths and Gray, 1994). Griffiths and Gray think
that, while entire developmental systems are replicated from one generation
to the next, the emphasis of evolutionary theorists should not include the
merely persistent features of these systems (e.g., gravity, sunlight), despite
the importance of these features to development (p. 290; although, note that,
confusingly, Griffiths and Gray 2001 say, “Fundamentally, the unit of both
development and evolution is the developmental system, the entire matrix of
interactants involved in a life cycle,” p. 206). Instead, Griffiths and Gray ar-
gue that a DST approach would focus on the replication of developmental
processes, where a developmental process is “a series of events which initiates
new cycles of itself” (p. 291). Each repetition of that developmental process
– each life cycle – is an evolutionary individual (p. 293). Griffiths and Gray
grant that these cycles can apply to different levels of analysis, e.g., cellular
or organismal (p. 295).
Pradeu (2010) argues against this view of units of selection, suggesting that
the organism should still be considered the appropriate biological individual,
insofar as the relevant explanandum of DST is the characteristics of the or-
ganism (p. 217). Keller (2001) also argues for an emphasis on the organism;
she thinks that omission of the significance of the body itself (in some cases,
she specifically refers to the cell) is too closely “reminiscent of conventional
maternal discourse” which treats the woman’s body (or, the cytoplasm of her
egg cell) as merely a source of nurture for a developing embryo.
West-Eberhard (2003) also disagrees with Griffiths and Gray (1994), al-
though her disagreement stems from the continuity of the phenotype, or “the
unbroken and overlapping connections between generations mediated by parentally
constructed offspring phenotypes” (p. 93). The lines between life cycles are
blurred by the continuity of the phenotype, and are connected via what West-
Eberhard calls an “inherited bridging phenotype – a responsive, organized cell
provided by a parent in the form of an egg, a newly divided cell, or a set of
cells that springs entirely from the previous generation, is adapted for sur-
vival and interaction in the gametic and embryonic environment, and is the
active and organized field upon which the zygotic/offspring genome products
and subsequent environments eventually act” (p. 91). In other words, West-
Eberhard thinks that the gamete itself (for example) has a set of phenotypes,
which are inherited by the zygote. This gametic phenotype is pre-adapted to
the developmental environment, due to its own history of gene-environment
interaction, such that the development of the organism cannot be said to start
with fertilization (or anywhere else, for that matter). Similar to Keller (2001),
then, West-Eberhard argues that focusing on the life cycle misrepresents the
importance of the material inheritance of gametic cell matter. West-Eberhard
thus advocates for a “phenotype-centered” view of evolution, wherein selection
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acts on phenotypes (p. 31, 98; note that Griffiths and Gray 2001, p. 198 seem
to agree with this).
Griffiths and Gray (1997), in responding to some criticisms provided by
Sterelny et al. (1996), attempt to address this problem of how to divide life
cycles precisely (see Griffiths and Gray 2001, 2004 for further elaboration
on these points). Reiterating their arguments in Griffiths and Gray (1994),
they say that DST defines a life cycle by the recurrence of processes; the
regularity of different developmental stages allows one to divide up a lineage
into different generations (p. 477). While this may respond to Sterelny et al.’s
concerns, it does not specifically address the continuity of the phenotype nor
the importance of inherited cellular resources.
Sterelny et al. (1996), and Griffiths and Gray (1997) in response, also
identify another problem with life cycles: that it is hard to distinguish different
life cycles or even different lineages in cases of tight-knit coevolution (p. 478).
In response, in one of the rare instances where DST proponents refer to results
from microbiology, Griffiths and Gray cite Margulis (1970, 1981) for the claim
that “the eukaryotic cell descends from a symbiotic association of previously
free-living organisms” (p. 478). Griffiths and Gray also refer to cases of obligate
symbiosis between microorganisms and their hosts, as well as slime molds and
lichens, as cases that complicate the distinction between discrete life cycles (p.
478-479). Other discussions of the units of selection in the context of DST are
also liable to mention microbial symbioses (e.g., Sterelny 2001, p. 342, 345;
Griffiths and Gray 2001, p. 198, 200, 210; Griffiths and Gray 2004, p. 410,
412). Somewhat surprisingly, there is no mention of holobionts in the DST
literature, that I know of.
There is nothing in developmental biology that settles the debate between
these different options for the units of selection; some developmental update
proponents have cogently argued for focusing on the life cycle or the organism,
but it is also compatible with their view to focus on phenotypes or holobionts.
The main disagreement that developmental update proponents have with non-
developmental update proponents is that the units of selection are unlikely to
be nicely nested levels of selection – from genes to species – but rather have to
accommodate the important interactions between different levels and between
different developmental resources which occur throughout a developmental
system. This proposed revision to our units of selection concept is supposed
to be tied to developmental biology in particular insofar as a focus on devel-
opmental systems – a developing organism and its developmental resources –
provides the impetus for this revision.
To reiterate, the point here is not that developmental update proponents
require an examination of microbiological evidence in order to levy their gen-
eral criticism of the standard view of units of selection: their criticism stands
merely on the basis of the developmental biological research which they high-
light. Instead, I think that an identical criticism pertaining to units of selection
can be levied from the perspective of microbiology, as we saw in section 2.1.
Thus, the results in developmental biology are sufficient but not necessary to
motivate an adjustment of our units of selection; the critique of the received
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view is more widespread than a focus on developmental biology would indi-
cate. The exact details of what our units of selection should be adjusted to still
needs to be fleshed out; a combination of developmental and microbiological
evidence may be necessary for this project.
4.2 Modes of Inheritance
As discussed above, proponents of a developmental update advocate for an
expanded view of inheritance, one which encompasses the variety of develop-
mental resources organisms inherit other than the genes they receive from their
parents. For example, organisms inherit environments (more on this in section
4.3), behaviors, preferences, and more. An expanded view of inheritance is
supposed to be tied to results in developmental biology insofar as a focus on
all developmental resources (as opposed to merely genetic resources) has en-
abled recognition of the fact that any of these resources might be inherited,
and may affect evolutionary trajectories accordingly.9
Modes of inheritance, unlike units of selection, is a topic on which nearly all
developmental update proponents agree (for a possible exception, see Pradeu
2010). I will first go through the main inheritance-related claims of DST, in
roughly chronological order. Gray (1992) argues for an “expanded view of in-
heritance” which includes cytoplastmic factors, chemical traces, gut microor-
ganisms, social traditions, and features of the environment (p. 179-181; see
also Oyama et al. 2001, p. 3-4; Stotz 2008, p. 371). Griffiths and Gray (1994)
grant that inheritance may be horizontal (between members of one generation)
rather than just vertical (from parent to offspring), for instance, in the case of
language inheritance as well as LGT (p. 303). Griffiths and Gray (1997) discuss
the epigenetic inheritance system, which involves inheriting cellular resources
necessary for DNA activation and replication (p. 473; see also Jablonka and
Lamb 1995, chpt. 4; Griffiths and Knight 1998, p. 254; Griffiths and Tabery
2013, p. 80; Griffiths and Hochman 2015, p. 4), and contrast their view with the
gene-centric extended replicator theory of Sterelny et al. (1996). Griffiths and
Gray (2001) go on to discuss further ways in which DST’s theory of inheritance
differs from the standard, gene-only and vertical-only theory of inheritance,
including vertical or horizontal inheritance of extracellular resources such as
the environment or other sources of information (cf. Sterelny 2001). Jablonka
and Lamb (2002) distinguish DST from evo-devo by the latter’s insistence
that genes are the sole units of heredity (p. 290; see also Griffiths and Gray
2004, p. 410, although cf. Griffiths and Gray 2005, p. 422). Jablonka and Lamb
(2005) say that there are four categories of inheritance – genetic, epigenetic,
behavioral, and symbolic – all of which are interrelated and can have evolution-
ary importance (see also Jablonka 2001). Jablonka and Lamb (2005), among
others, also recognize that an expanded view of inheritance is likely to sound
like the Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characteristics (e.g., Stotz 2010,
9 For a discussion of the relationship between developmental biology and expanded views
of inheritance, see Jablonka (2007).
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p. 490); some reject this interpretation, but developmental update proponents
largely embrace it (see Jablonka and Lamb 2005, p. 13 for an argument). All
of these authors agree that non-genetic inheritance can and likely does affect
evolution (for an explicit argument to this effect, see Griffiths 2017, p. 6).
Other developmental update proponents agree that non-genetic resources
can be inherited (e.g., West-Eberhard 2003, p. 115). In particular, Gilbert
et al. (2012), Gilbert (2014), and Gilbert and Epel (2015) emphasize the likely
importance of inherited microbial endosymbionts. Microbes as an inherited
developmental resource are also relatively well-recognized by DST proponents
(e.g., Gray 1992; Griffiths and Gray 2001; Griffiths 2002). However, as I argued
in section 2.2, it is not only in their roles as symbionts that microorganisms
challenge the received view of inheritance; other mechanisms such as LGT
indicate that an update to biological theory is in order. Developmental update
proponents also usually ignore directed mutagenesis as a possible instance of
this phenomenon. A unique exception is given by Jablonka and Lamb (1995,
2005), who do discuss directed mutations, including in both the microbial and
non-microbial contexts (e.g., Jablonka and Lamb 2005, chpt. 3).
Thus, again, the developmental biological evidence is sufficient but not nec-
essary to recommend an update concerning modes of inheritance, and much
microbiological evidence to this effect has been ignored by developmental up-
date proponents. Microbiological evidence pertaining to modes of inheritance
includes the importance of horizontal inheritance (especially via LGT and en-
dosymbiosis), but also directed mutagenesis and epigenetic inheritance. Each
of these issues are important to the developmental update as well.
4.3 Reciprocal Causation
The insights of developmental update proponents begin with the claim, ac-
cepted by all, that the environment is a necessary causal factor in develop-
ment. This empirical fact has led some developmental update proponents,
especially DST theorists, to focus on developmental systems, which include
the organism and all of the resources influencing its developmental trajectory.
Developmental update proponents have noticed, though, that it is not just the
case that the environment (among other developmental resources) affects the
developmental process, but that the organism and its development can affect
the environment as well.
The most extensively theorized way in which an organism can affect its
environment is through niche construction (Odling-Smee et al., 1996, 2003;
Laland et al., 2001). Niche construction occurs when organisms influence their
environments in ways that change the selective pressures on the organism,
which, in turn, can have an impact on the evolutionary success of that organ-
ism’s descendants. As Odling-Smee et al. (2003) point out, niche construction
is thus not merely a consequence of evolution but part of the process of evolu-
tion itself, especially insofar as the resulting constructed niches are inherited
just as any other developmental resource (p. 116; see also Odling-Smee et al.
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1996, although cf. Sterelny 2001). Responsiveness of the organism to the en-
vironment plays a crucial role in niche construction: organisms must be able
to respond to the environment they are currently in in the right kind of way
for niche construction to occur successfully (Gilbert et al., 2015).
Many proponents of a developmental update have discussed niche construc-
tion, due to the “underlying idea that organisms actively construct their envi-
ronments and by this means provide another inheritance mechanism” (Stotz
2010, p. 485; see also Stotz 2008). Insofar as a developmental update involves
the observation that entire developmental systems are reproduced and recon-
structed each generation, the environmental components of a developmental
system must also be thus reproduced, a process which occurs in part due to
the actions of the organisms themselves (Griffiths and Tabery, 2013, p. 81).
However, as Griffiths and Gray (2001) point out, “niche construction is still
a fundamentally dichotomous account of evolution” because there are, on the
one hand, selective pressures coming from the environmental niche acting on
the organism and, on the other hand, construction of the environmental niche
by the organism (p. 206; see also Gray 1992). Developmental update propo-
nents prefer to do away with these dichotomies, and instead think about the
coevolution of organisms and environment or, more specifically, the recipro-
cal causation among all parts of a developmental system (Griffiths and Gray,
1994; Griffiths and Knight, 1998; Oyama et al., 2001; Griffiths and Gray, 2004).
Furthermore, as Lewontin (2001) points out, not only can organisms influence
their environment by consuming or creating resources, potentially making the
environment more or less hospitable to their progeny, but organisms also de-
fine and interpret their environments based on how the environment is related
to their development (p. 64). In other words, what counts as a relevant fea-
ture of the environment is in large part determined by the organism, so even
if the organism is not physically altering its environment in any way, the or-
ganism is still somewhat selecting which surrounding resources constitute its
environment.
In the context of reciprocal causation, or even in the more specific con-
text of niche construction, I have found only one case where developmental
update proponents have discussed microorganisms as agents of environmental
change: Jablonka and Lamb (2005) say, “Even bacteria and blue-green algae
(Cyanobacteria), the oldest inhabitants of our planet, can be thought of as
ecological engineers” (p. 237). With this one exception, developmental update
proponents appear to only focus on the role of microorganisms in these cycles
when the microorganisms are serving as symbionts, i.e., as developmental re-
sources. For example, rhizobia, the nitrogen-fixing bacteria which has formed
facultative or obligate symbioses with many plants, is a classic example of sym-
biosis used by developmental biologists (e.g., Gilbert and Epel 2015). However,
this would be theorized along with other symbioses, not as an instance where
the rhizobia are undertaking niche construction. Taking a microbe-centered
view of the rhizobia case would lead to a richer analysis, and one compatible
with the theoretical goals of the developmental update.
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Take also the case of Wolbachia, the aforementioned insect parasite. Grif-
fiths and Gray (2001), for example, recognize Wolbachia as a developmental
resource (i.e., something which affects development) that can be inherited (p.
200), as does West-Eberhard (2003, p. 528). The niche construction framing
of the Wolbachia case, on the other hand, wouldn’t treat Wolbachia as a de-
velopmental resource, but as a developmental system in its own right, capable
of shaping and being shaped by its environment (of which the hosts are a
part). This framing of the case has thus far been overlooked by developmental
update proponents.
As was the case with units of selection and modes of inheritance, then,
while developmental update proponents have perhaps adequately made their
case regarding reciprocal causation solely on the basis of developmental bio-
logical evidence, an identical case can be made by using an examination of
microbiological evidence. Developmental results are not necessary to make the
claims that developmental update proponents want to advance regarding re-
ciprocal causation.
4.4 Rates of Evolutionary Change
This final section is about an underemphasized implication of developmental
biology, especially within DST: that a developmental systems view may affect
what we think about the rates of evolution.10 Changing the expected rates
of evolution is a direct consequence of focusing on multiple, potentially non-
genetic, modes of inheritance. Horizontal inheritance in particular has clear
implications for rates: if fully functional traits can be passed on horizontally,
rather than vertically, evolutionary change can be seen in a minimum of zero
generations. Change by means of vertical inheritance (i.e., by random genetic
mutation) requires a minimum of one generation.
Despite this relatively straightforward inference, proponents of a devel-
opmental update have by and large neglected to focus on rates of change.
Indeed, I have found only very rarely any discussion of rates in the devel-
opmental update-friendly literature. For example, Jablonka and Lamb (2005)
discuss the implications of epigenetic inheritance for rates of change explicitly:
“adaptation through the selection of epigenetic variants may be quite rapid
compared with adaptation through genetic change” (p. 145; see also Jablonka
and Lamb 1995). Jablonka and Lamb also indicate that rapid speciation events
may be caused by epigenetic or even behavioral changes, rather than genetic
ones (p. 144-145, 184, 250, 309). Horizontal inheritance in particular (which
may be genetic, but can also be epigenetic or behavioral) can cause the rates
10 There is some interesting new work on integrating developmental biology and paleon-
tology in discussions surrounding rates (e.g., Jablonski 2020; Jackson 2020). For example,
developmental biologists may be able to study “evolvability,” which then can affect paleon-
tologists’ prediction of rates. Nevertheless, these issues largely have not been picked up by
developmental update proponents as such. For further discussion of the relationship between
developmental biology and paleontology, see Watkins (2021a).
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of change to be higher than they would be with only vertical inheritance (p.
188).
Actually, West-Eberhard notes that developmental plasticity can affect
rates of change either by increasing them or decreasing them (p. 178; see
also Pigliucci 2001, p. 57-58, 213 for a very brief mention of this), including
by potentially causing speciation events (2003, chapter 27). Plasticity can in-
crease rates of evolution in the manner similar to the one mentioned above:
if all members of a given population are exposed to novel environmental con-
ditions, and react phenotypically to those conditions in the same, novel way,
then the members of that population will express a novel (potentially adap-
tive!) phenotype all at once; this, in contrast to the usual story that involves
only a few “lucky” individuals with appropriate genetic mutations express-
ing the phenotype which matches the novel environment. Plasticity can also,
though, decrease rates of change in cases of hyperplasticity, such as learning,
because in such cases it is extremely unlikely that plasticity will produce any
recurring phenotype at all. West-Eberhard is unique among developmental up-
date proponents in noting these possible implications of plasticity for the rates
of change. Thus, evidence of the effect of developmental plasticity on evolution
has inspired some developmental update proponents to call for a reevaluation
of rates.
One reason why developmental update proponents may avoid talking about
rates of change is their constant effort to distance themselves from anything re-
motely resembling Larmarckism or saltationism. Even West-Eberhard, despite
her recognition of the relationship between developmental plasticity and rates
of change, goes to great lengths to demonstrate that she does not think that
acquired characteristics can be inherited, in order to show that her remarks
about evolution are perfectly consistent with the neo-Darwinian account (e.g.,
West-Eberhard 2003, chpt. 24). At least some theorists using microbiology as
their starting place have not tended to shy away from Larmarckism to quite
the same degree (e.g., Koonin and Wolf 2009). Accordingly, and in line with
Jablonka and Lamb (1995, 2005), I am more inclined to think that devel-
opmental update proponents and others who advocate for a re-centering of
developmental biology in evolutionary theorizing should treat inheritance of
acquired characteristics and saltation as legitimate, empirically-testable hy-
potheses, thereby re-framing these historical debates using new evidence and
methods. The field of microbiology has been able to sanction a reexamination
of rates of change on the basis of horizontal inheritance, without continuing
to view all proposed instances of immediate change as heretical.
Therefore, again, the evidence base that developmental update proponents
could use to advocate for a revision to the presumed rates of evolutionary
change could include microbiological evidence. If developmental update pro-
ponents were to begin to advocate more seriously for a reevaluation of rates,
the microbiological evidence would serve them well.
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5 Summary and Discussion
I have argued that at least four themes of the proposed developmental update
– regarding units of selection, modes of inheritance, reciprocal causation, and
rates of change – can also be seen as consequences of microbiological research.
In particular, I have focused on results in microbiology about microorganisms
themselves, rather than on results which treat microorganisms only as develop-
mental resources in a developmental system centered on a larger, multicellular
organism, like an animal or a plant.
In the case of units of selection, developmental update proponents have no-
ticed that focusing on the developmental system as a whole complicates how
we should think about biological individuality. There is not currently agree-
ment among developmental update proponents or DST-friendly biologists over
what the units of selection should be, exactly, but I have argued that a focus
on microbial communities such as biofilms complications the units of selection
debate in exactly the same way as a focus on developmental systems does. In
the case of modes of inheritance, by contrast, there is widespread agreement
among developmental update proponents that inheritance should be expanded
to include horizontal inheritance as well as vertical inheritance, and that non-
genetic resources can be inherited in much the same way as genetic resources
can. I have argued that both of these conclusions also follow from focusing on
microbial inheritance mechanisms, including LGT, directed mutagenesis, and
epigenetics. In the case of reciprocal causation, developmental update propo-
nents have argued that organisms should be seen as agents of environmental
change (including niche construction); I have argued that microorganisms also
affect their environment in this way. Finally, in the case of rates of evolution,
I have argued both that developmental update proponents should more fully
recognize the implications of their view – that rates of evolution may increase
or decrease depending on the sort of environmental contingencies involved –
and that these implications can be seen through a microbiological lens as well.
In all cases, developmental biological evidence is sufficient but not necessary
for reaching the theoretical conclusions – microbiological evidence suffices as
well.
Why hasn’t the microbiological evidence cited above had the same degree of
influence on biological theory as the developmental biological evidence? Why
might developmental update proponents have focused on developmental biol-
ogy rather than microbiology? One related question, posted by Griffiths and
Gray (2004): “What, one might ask, is developmental about developmental
systems theory?” (p. 425). On the one hand, it is easy to see that microor-
ganisms (at least, single-celled microorganisms) aren’t going to be particularly
relevant to developmental biology, if development requires cell differentiation.
However, the explanation that I prefer is that it is just a historical accident
that developmental systems theorists along with other developmental update
proponents focused on developmental biology and not microbiology. Griffiths
and Stotz (2018) explain: “most scientific work in the developmental systems
tradition was on behavior development, . . . [and] philosophical discussion of
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DST focused on its implications for ‘gene-centered’ views of molecular devel-
opmental biology and evolutionary biology” (p. 225-226). This trend seems
to me to be more a consequence of the prior interests and expertise of these
biologists and philosophers than of any principled reason to focus on devel-
opmental biology per se. Thus, I would posit that there nothing (or, at least,
very little) especially developmental about DST or about the developmental
update.
There are other historically contingent reasons that might explain why de-
velopmental update proponents have focused solely on developmental biology,
rather than on both developmental and microbiology. I will gesture at a few of
these. First of all, I think that it is possible that the close relationship between
microbiology and molecular biology turned developmental update proponents
off to microbiology, because part of their position is to limit the focus on
molecular biology. However, I hope to have shown in section 2 that the con-
tributions of microbiology exceed those related to molecular biology. Second,
historically it has been true that much research in microbiology has focused on
disease, rather than on evolution.11 Studying microbes as more than possible
sources of infection, and outside of medical schools, is a relatively recent devel-
opment, a fact which may have contributed to the sidelining of microbiology
by developmental update proponents.
Looking to the future, it is actually not necessarily the case that a devel-
opmental perspective cannot include a microbiological perspective. Indeed, it
is rather odd to compare and contrast microbiology – which encompasses two
entire domains of life – with developmental biology; microbiology is perhaps
more aptly compared to a combination of botany, mycology, and zoology, the
main areas of study for macrobial life.12 The assumption that microorgan-
isms do not develop is common, although most likely false, depending on how
we conceive of development. O’Malley (2014) mentions the field of microbial
developmental biology, which has broadened the definition of development
to include not just cell differentiation within one organism but also cell dif-
ferentiation in response to environmental conditions (p. 119). For example,
Myxococcus bacteria form social groups, and cells in different parts of these
groups adopt different phenotypes (O’Malley 2014 lists several other examples
as well; see pages 119-120). Developmental update proponents would likely
be very sympathetic to this broadened conception of development, but it has
gone unmentioned in the developmental update-related literature thus far,
perhaps because many developmental update proponents think that microbes
do not exhibit developmental properties. O’Malley (2014) also discusses an
even broader conception of development, one which would allow that unicel-
lular organisms can themselves develop. Specifically, the ability for single cells
to take on different phenotypes in response to environmental conditions re-
sembles the process of development insofar as it is a product of both genetic
and environmental information and resources. These considerations have led
11 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this possible explanation.
12 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this.
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Love and Travisano (2013), for example, to argue that microbes can serve as
model organisms in the context of developmental biology. Accordingly, I think
that a further examination of the definition of development, and in particular
whether it could apply to single-celled microorganisms, would be a fruitful
area of future research for developmental update proponents to pursue.
One final remark concerns the fact that developmental biology and micro-
biology happen to have many of the same theoretical consequences. Of course,
one could view this as purely coincidental, or as the result of the fact that the
empirical results in microbiology and developmental biology aren’t as easily
separable as I have made them out to be. Another possibility, though, is that
we have a convergence of multiple lines of evidence in favor of the same theo-
retical postulates. Convergence is often taken as additional confirmation. So,
perhaps the fact that developmental and microbiologists agree with respect to
a few theoretical claims should count as an argument in favor of these claims.
6 Conclusion
I have argued that microbiological evidence, as well as evidence from devel-
opmental biology, supports at least four of the revisions to biological theory
argued for by developmental update proponents, concerning: units of selec-
tion, modes of inheritance, reciprocal causation, and rates of evolution. In
all of these cases, both developmental and microbiological evidence is suf-
ficient to recommend a theoretical update. This raises the question of why
developmental update proponents have neglected microbiological evidence, or
why microbiological evidence hasn’t independently been taken to recommend
a large-scale update to biological theory. I have argued that there is no in-
principle reason that developmental as opposed to microbiological evidence
has been used to this end, and suggested that it is more likely the result
of historical contingencies. Additionally, I have suggested that the scope of
“development” be broadened to make a combination of microbiological and
developmental evidence more commonplace.
The purpose of this paper has been to show that there are major areas
about which developmental and microbiological evidence largely agree. How-
ever, this does not mean that they will agree in all cases. There may be some
areas for which microbiological evidence recommends a theoretical update and
developmental biological evidence remains silent. While this issue is outside of
the scope of the present paper to address, I do think that further comparisons
between the theoretical implications of developmental and microbiological ev-
idence – including on areas where they disagree – is a fruitful line of research.
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